|
The Digital Media Project |
|||
|
Source |
G. Colyer |
||
|
Title |
TRU #30 to freedom from monitoring |
No. |
040115colyer01 |
|
Name: |
Greg Colyer |
|
Affiliation/additional information: |
None |
|
Date submitted: |
2004/01/15 |
| # | Criteria | Description |
| 1. | Name of TRU |
TRU to freedom
from monitoring |
| 2. | Summary description of TRU |
The
traditional right to use personal property without any reference to
another authority. The freedom not to be observed whilst doing so, or to
have one's usage recorded or tracked. |
| 3. | Use records of TRU |
After
purchasing a book [audio CD, video], no further communication with the
publisher takes place on reading [listening, watching]. This is clearly
related to privacy, but also underpins other TRUs such as the TRU to
annotate for personal use (e.g. write marginal notes in a book) and the
TRUs to time- and space-shift. Because the control over a book [audio CD,
video] is determined solely by physical access to it, these other TRUs
were inherently possible and not practically preventable. |
| 4. | Nature of TRU |
Customary, but
may now be explicitly supported (to some extent) by human rights and/or
data-protection legislation. Also legally supported in the sense that
reading books [listening to audio CDs, watching videos] is totally outside
the scope of copyright law because no copying is involved. |
| 5. | Benefits of TRU |
All users may
benefit; no-one is obviously negatively affected by this right per se. |
| 6. | Possible digital support |
Digital
support would be easy! The problem is that it might impact other
functionalities. Therefore this TRU may not be supportable in all digital
contexts to the traditional extent. The underlying legal situation is also
different because in many jurisdictions almost any digital use currently
constitutes copying (e.g. from disk into memory). Note that this
distinction in law may have arisen partly because of the greater ease of
monitoring digital transactions. |
| 7. | Requirements |
Methods using
offline verification (e.g. checking an inline digital signature) should be
able to support this TRU completely. However, any client-server method
would probably violate it to some extent; the properties of the
client-server connection alone would reveal some information about the
end-user. "Anonymity" could dissociate the personal identity of the user
from the client-server interaction. "Tracking" would be monitoring that
could be linked from session to session, and this could be inhibited by
lower-level anonymity. But no form of anonymity is likely to be perfect,
and in any case the TRU is partly an issue of principle. |
| 8. | References |